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It is completely unrealistic to construe the constitutional guarantee
against self-incrimination, whether occurring in a state or federal con-
stitution, as permitting compulsion of a witness to testify when it is
certain or probable that he will be prosecuted in a court of the other
jurisdiction a few blocks away. The constitutional guarantee should
be given its full implication or it should be amended. Otherwise,
courts could give it full effect by refusing to compel testimony in any
situation where prosecution is likely to follow within either state or
federal jurisdiction. This could be done by judicial interpretation,
or if that would bring about confusion, then a declaratory statute
might be adopted to avoid conflict with previous decisions to the
contrary.
WENDELL SAFIrE WILLIAMS
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-DUTY OF A DONOR OF AN
AUTOMOBILE-ESTES V. GIBSON
The plaintiff was injured when the defendant's adult son negli-
gently ran an automobile, given to him by the defendant mother,
into a gasoline pump and caused an explosion which showered the
plaintiff with burning gasoline. The plaintiff brought an action against
the defendant mother, alleging that having knowledge, actual or con-
structive, that her son "by reason of his physical and mental condition
and by reason of his habits of insobriety and his addiction to the use of
hypnotic drugs and narcotics .. .was, at all times mentioned herein,
a careless, reckless and incompetent operator of a motor vehicle," she
carelessly and negligently purchased the automobile for her son, placed
it in his possession, and permitted and allowed him to operate it. The
title to the automobile at the time of the accident was in the son. The
defendant mother's general demurrer to the petition was sustained
and the complaint against her was dismissed. On appeal, held, judg-
ment affirmed by a divided court, 4-3.1
It would seem that to sustain the general demurrer is to hold
flatly that, as a matter of law, one who transfers an automobile by gift
to an adult is not liable to a third party who is subsequently injured by
the negligent operation of the automobile by the donee, even if at the
time of the gift the donor had knowledge that the donee was an in-
competent operator of any motor vehicle.
The decision of the majority seems to turn chiefly on the fact that
' Supra note 1 at 447.
'Estes v. Gibson, 257 S. W. 2d 604 (Ky. 1953).
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the defendant passed title to her son, and that at the time of the ac-
cident he was the absolute owner.2 It seems to be admitted that had
the defendant merely rented or lent the car with knowledge that her
son was an incompetent driver, she would have been liable for the
plaintiff's injuries which arose through the subsequent negligent opera-
tion by the son.3 Her liability in such a case would not have rested
upon her ownership of the automobile, but upon her own negligent
conduct in furnishing it to one known to be an incompetent driver.
4
The plaintiff's case is pitched on the legal principle set out in the
Restatement of Torts, section 890:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the
use of another whom the supplier knows or from the facts known to
him should know to be likely because of his youth, inexperience or
otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of bodily
harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect to share
in, or be in the vicinity of its use, is subject to liability for bodily
harm caused thereby to them.5
Both the majority and the minority opinions in the instant case recog-
nize the validity of this general principle of law.
The majority of the court determined, however, that a supplier
within the meaning of this Restatement section does not include a
vendor, donor or any person who passes title to the one supplied. In
so determining, the court observed that:
- The majority opinion also noted that Ky. REV. STAT. 186.440 (4) denies an
operator's license to 'an habitual drunkard or drug addict". In the absence of a
plea to the contrary, the court presumed that the defendant's son had been issued
an operator's license, which indicated that the state, through its officers, sanctioned
his ownership and right to drive the automobile involved. In Tipton v. Estill Ice
Co., 279 Ky. 793, 132 S. W. 2d 347 (1939), the Kentucky Court of Appeals held
that it was not competent for the General Assembly to make the mere failure to
secure an operator's license prima facie evidence of negligent driving since such
a violation of the law has no evidentiary relation to or logical tendency to prove
the fact of negligence. Since that time, in 1940, the Kentucky statute has been
amended to require an examination to obtain a driver's license, and no decision
has been made as to the constitutionality of the law as amended. If failure to
have a driver's license is no evidence of negligence, how then can possession of
a license be evidence of competence?
3Owensboro Undertaking and Livery Ass'n v. Henderson, 273 Ky. 112, 115
S. W. 2d 563 (1938). (An owner who rented an automobile to a person whom
he knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, was intoxicated
and incompetent to drive was held liable for injuries to a third party arising out
of the incompetent operation of the car by the person so receiving it.) Sanders v.
Lakes, 270 Ky. 98, 109 S. W. 2d 36 (1937); Brady v. B & B Ice Co., 242 Ky.
138, 45 S. W. 2d 1051 (1931); See also 5 BLASHFIELD, Cy. OF AuTo LAW AND
PRAC., sees. 2924, 2927 (1935); 60 C.J.S. 1062 (1949). All of these citations are
included in the majority opinion of the instant case in support of this general
principle of law.
" In Brady v. B & B Ice Co., supra note 3, the court stated: "If an owner lends
his automobile to another under circumstances that do not warrant the application
of the doctrine of respondeat superior, any liability attaching to him does so by
reason of his own negligence in knowingly permitting the use of it in such a way
as would probably cause injury to others." See also 5 Am. JJR. 696 (1936).
'RESTATEmENT, ToRTs sec. 390 (1934).
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. . . the various explanatory illustrations [to Section 890 of the Re-
statement] show the broad and abstract statement of the rule has its
limitations. The illustrations are confined to cases of agency and bail-
ment, as by permitting the use of, lending or hiring an automobile
or other potentially or inherently dangerous instrumentality. 6
To further support their decision to restrict the applicability of this
Restatement section, the majority cited at length an Alabama decision 7
closely in point which held that in the absence of an allegation of
relationship constituting a legal control over the donee at the time of
the accident, the donee would be liable for his own negligence, but the
liability would not extend and attach to the donor, even if he gave
him the automobile with the knowledge that the donee was an in-
competent operator.
Since the case law makes it clear that the liability of one who rents
or lends his automobile to a known incompetent is not predicated on
his ownership, but upon his own negligent conduct in so placing an
automobile in the possession of an incompetent," the minority of the
court refused to recognize the validity of the contention of the majority
that the liability set out in this Restatement section is limited to cases
in which a legal relationship, such as agency or bailment, can be shown
between the supplier and the one supplied at the time of the accident.
In other sections of the Restatement of Torts, it is expressly pro-
vided that section 390 shall apply to a donor.9 An intermediate
court in New York has applied section 890 to a, case analogous
to the one at hand.10 That court ruled that a complaint against a
father alleging that he had bought an automobile for his adult son
whom the father knew to be an epilptic stated a cause of action for
damages resulting from the son's wrecking the car when he had an
epileptic fit. The epileptic son was most likely a capable driver at
times, but he was unfit to drive because at any time his defect might
become active. The defendant's son in the instant case may have been
capable of driving at times, but was unfit because his habits of in-
sobriety and addiction to narcotics might at any time make him
'Supra note 1, at 605.
'Shipp v. Davis, 25 Ala. App. 104, 141 So. 866, 367 (1932).
'Supra notes 2 and 3.
'RESTATEmENT, ToRTs sec. 390 is a component part of Topic 1, Chapter 14.
The introductory scope note to Topic 1 states: "This topic states the rules which
are equally applicable to all persons who in any way or for any purpose supply
chattels for the use of others or permit others to use their chattels." RESTAT MNT,
ToRTs sec. 405 provides expressly that "One who directly or through a third person
gives or lends a chattel for another to use, knowing it to be or likely to be danger-
ous for the use for which it is given or lent, is subject to liability as stated in sees.
388-390 [which sections comprise Topic 1, Chapter 14 of the RFsrwAEMr.]"
Comment (a) to sec. 405 lists comment (c) to sec. 888 as pertinent, which de-
fines persons to be included as "suppliers" as being "vendors, lessors, donors or
lenders." Thus within the RESTATEmENT, it is expressly provided that sec. 390
shall apply to a donor situation such as presented in the instant case.
C olemberg v. Blumberg, 262 App. Div. 759, 27 N. Y. S. 2d 692 (1941).
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dangerous. It would seem that the negligence involved in placing an
automobile in the possession of an habitual drunkard and dope addict
is equally as great as that involved in placing such a vehicle in the
possession of an epilpetic.
The majority opinion seems to suggest in conclusion that the prob-
lem presented is one of extending "the vicarious liability of an owner
or controller" to a donor or seller of an automobile. Vicarious liability,
however, is defined as the responsibility of one person, without fault
or any wrongful conduct of his own, for the tort of another.11 It is sub-
mitted that the question presented in the instant case is not whether to
extend liability of the donor without fault of his own, but whether to
allow a donor to escape liability for his own negligent conduct merely
because the title to the chattel is passed to the donee.
In support of the decision, the majority opinion also considered at
length the causal connection between the gift of the car to the in-
competent son and the subsequent injury to the plaintiff through the
son's negligent operation of the automobile. In holding that the
causal connection was too tenuous and remote to allow recovery, the
court considered chiefly the time element.12 The declaration con-
tained no allegation of the time elapsing between the gift and the ac-
cident. Construing the pleading strictly against the pleader, the court
decided that there must have been a considerable interval of time
between the two acts, during which time the son may have operated
the automobile without mishap. Restatement of Torts, section 433,
is cited in the opinion of the majority of the court as authority sup-
porting their contention that one of the elements to be considered
in determining causal connection is the lapse of time between the
negligent act and the injury complained of. The majority opinion
"Pnossan, TORTs 471 (1941). The "family purpose doctrine" is an in-
stance of this vicarious liability. The mother of a 20 year old son may be liable
for a single negligent lapse of the youth in driving the family automobile, although
she had no notice of any incompetence on his part and he is in fact a careful
driver. The mother of a 21 year old son will not be liable for providing him with
an automobile regardless of how incompetent the son may be even if she has
knowledge of the incompetency under such family purpose doctrine.
I' The majority of the court also considered in regard to the causation factor
the allegation of the plaintiff as to the physical condition of the defendant's son
at the time of the accident. It was merely alleged that the son was by reason of
his habits of insobriety and his addiction to the use of hypnotic drugs and
narcotics, "at all times mentioned herein, a careless, reckless and incompetent
driver of any motor vehicle." The majority court opinion states briefly that it was
not alleged that at the time of the accident that the defendant's son was under
the influence of drugs or intoxicants. However, since the demurrer admits all
matters of fact which are well pleaded, it is submitted that under the allegations
made the only logical conclusion which may be reached is that it is alleged that
the son was at the time of the accident an incompetent driver by reason of his
habits of insobriety and his addiction to the use of hypnotic drugs and narcotics.
Any other interpretation of the pleadings would be fatal to the cause of the
plaintiff.
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seems to take no note, however, of the comment to clause (d) of the
Restatement, section 433 which states:
Where it is evident that the influence of the actor's negligence is still
a substantial factor, mere lapse of time, no matter how long, is not
sufficient to prevent it from being the legal cause of the other's harm.
Certainly the placing of the automobile in the possession of one who
is known by him to be an habitual drunkard and drug addict, and
thus an incompetent operator of any motor vehicle, is a substantial
factor in any subsequent injury arising out of the incompetent opera-
tion by the person receiving it, regardless of the time elapsing between
the act of placing the car in the other's possession and the injury to a
third party.
It is submitted that the holding of the majority in the instant case
is an unfortunate one. It establishes as law in Kentucky that a donor
of an automobile is not liable to a third party who is injured by the
negligent operation of the automobile by the donee, even if at the
time of the gift the donor knows the donee is an incompetent driver.
The reasoning is not entirely clear. The majority is willing to accept
as law in this jurisdiction that an owner who lends his car to a known
incompetent is liable for injuries to third parties arising from the
negligent operation of the one so receiving it, and that such liability is
not predicated on the ownership of the automobile, but upon the
owner's negligence in so supplying the vehicle.' 3 Yet they hold that
ownership in the supplier at the time of the accident is prerequisite
to his liability for furnishing the automobile to a known incompetent.' 4
A fine line of distinction is thus drawn between the negligence of one
who supplies by lending or hiring and the negligence of one who sup-
plies by giving or selling. It is submitted that the minority opinion is
"Supra notes 2 and 3.
" A question which seemed to disturb the majority of the court throughout
was at what point the liability of a supplier should be limited. If such liability is
not to be limited to suppliers who retain title or control of the chattel, just where is
the line to be drawn. It is submitted that the proper limits of any supplier's
liability, whether or not he passes title to the chattel to the one supplied, are set
forth in RESTATENIENT, TORTS sec. 390. Such liability is limited to suppliers who,
at the time of furnishing the chattel, know, or in the exercise of orny care
should know, that the one supplied is a careless, reckless or incompetent user of
such a chattel. Recovery is limited to persons whom the supplier can expect to
share in or to be in the vicinity of the chatters use. The chattel involved must be
such as to involve an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to others when used in a
careless, reckless or incompetent manner. The harm caused must be bodily harm
and the supplier is not liable for injuries to property interests. And in each of
these cases the particular carelessness, recklessness or incompetence which the
supplier is charged with knowledge must be the proximate cause of the injury to
the plaintiff. It is submitted therefore that the limits of liability of a supplier
under this general principle of law are well founded and sufficient and that to
further limit such liability because the supplier merely passes title to the one
supplied is error.
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correct in observing that if a distinction is to be drawn between the
negligence of one who lends his car and one who gives his car to a
known incompetent or reckless driver, "the more reasonable view
would suggest that one who gives an automobile to a known incom-
petent driver, placing in him the power to use it at any and all times,
drunk or sober, sane, or insane, is more negligent than one who merely
lends the vehicle for one specific occasion."15 The mere passing of
title does not change the character of the negligence of the defendant,
and it is submitted that the law should not operate to relieve him of his
responsibility for the natural and probable consequences of his own
negligent act.
C. GIBSON DoWNING, JI.
WORKER'S RIGHT TO REFUSE TO CROSS A PICKET LINE
National Labor Relations Board v. Rockaway News Supply Co.,
Inc.,' was brought to the United States Supreme Court by a grant of
certiorari2 to the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit,
which had denied the enforcement of a National Labor Relations
Board order.3 This order sought to have one Charles Waugh rein-
stated as a chauffeur and routeman of the respondent, Rockaway News
Supply Co., Inc.4
Waugh, an employee of respondent for seven years, had the job
of driving a truck along a regular route picking up and delivering
certain newspapers. He, like others similarly employed, was a member
of the Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union of New York and
Vicinity.
On the morning of Thursday, March 2, 1950, Waugh learned that
a union, other than the one of which he was a member, had placed
pickets before the premises of the Daily Review Corporation, a plant
which his duties required him to enter. He immediately went to his
foreman and stated that, as a union member, he would not cross the
picket line, but would pick up the consignments of the strike bound
plant if they were brought to a point outside the picket line. This
was done for two days, but on the third day the foreman told him that
"257 S. W. 2d 604, 608.
'National Labor Relations Board v. Rockaway News Supply Co., Inc., 345
U. S. 71 (1952).
-344 U. S. 863 (1952).
'National Labor Relations Board v. Rockaway News Supply Co., Inc., 197
F. 2d 111 (2d Cir. 1952).
'National Labor Relations Board v. Rockaway News Supply Co., Inc., 95
N. L. R. B. 336 (1951).
